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Ill THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
·1 11,11A H/\LL, CITY CAB COMPAl!Y, 
l IJC , and THE STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
/\poellants, 
-v- Case No. 19345 
SEC'O;!D WJURY FUND, 
Respondent. 
7\PPCAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
STATEMENT OF THE :JATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from an order of the Industrial 
comrn1ss1on confirming the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
La»·1 of the Administrative Law Judge. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The Administrative Law Judge confirmed the findings 
,,f the rnedical panel that \Vilma Hall's industrial accident 
d1d not result in permanent incapacity substantially greater 
than she would have incurred if she had not had a number of 
ere-existing conditions. The Administrative Law Judge, Richard 
'· ~umsion, entered his Findings of Fact, Conclus~ons of Law 
·,nd Cnder in the case on April 21, 1983. The Industrial Commission 
r 1 tah confirmed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
,jer and denied the State Insurance Fund's Motion for Review 
' lune 29, 1983. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant, State Insurance Fund, is asking this Court 1,, 
reverse the Order of the Industrial Commission insofar as 
it states that the industrial accident did not result in a 
permanent incapacity substantially greater than the plaintiff 
would have sustained had she not had her pre-existing i ncapacit LP:, 
and insofar as it denies reimbursement to the State Insurance FCJnc 
from the Second Injury Fund. The Utah State Insurance Fund 
has paid approximately $12,000.00 for medical expenses and 
compensation to the applicant since the industrial accident. 
The finding of the Commission, that the accident did not 
result in a permanent incapacity substantially greater than 
that which the applicant would have incurred if she had not 
had the pre-existing injuries, effectively denies the State 
Insurance Fund reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund in 
a case where the applicant has suffered from a long history 
of pre-existing conditions that the medical panel rated as 
47% whole man impairment. The panel stated the industrial 
accident increased the applicant's permanent partial impair-
ment to 52%. 
Reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund, provided for 
in Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-69, cannot be ordered unless 
the applicant sustains an incapacity substantially greater 
than that which she would have incurred if she had not 
had pre-existing incapacities. This statute further require-
that the pre-existing incapacity be a permanent incapacitv. 
Appellant asserts that the pre-existing incapacities were 
permanent and the applicant's industrial accident resulted 
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1 permanent incapacity substantially greater than that which 
,,,~ would have incurred had she not had pre-existing incapacities. 
llants seek to have the Order of the Industrial Commission 
rruled and a new order entered granting appellants reimburse-
ment according to the medical panel evaluation. The Utah State 
Insurance Fund should be reimbursed from the Second Injury Fund 
for 47/52nds, or 90%, of the expenses and compensation it has 
paid. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
TC"le plaintiff, Wilma Hall, sustained injuries on March 
9, 1981, during the course of her employment as a cab driver, 
~hen she was struck broadside by another car (R. 18-19). Ms. 
Hall was taken to the emergency center for treatment and was 
released (R. 20). Since the accident, Ms. Hall has suffered 
'"creas1ngly severe neck, back and leg problems, and has not 
returned to work (R. 19-20). Ms. Hall has suffered from 
hypothyroid obesity for the majority of her life, weighing 
on the average, 275 pounds (R. 27). During the first four 
~onths after the accident, Ms. Hall gained approximately 100 
add1t1onal pounds (R. 27). In addition to the hypothyroid 
obesity, Ms. Hall has suffered from angina for the past 20 
'ears, for which she has been hospitalized on numerous 
,·c1::1.;1ons (R. 30-31). Finally, Ms. Hall suffers from 
Je,1,c11erat1ve cervical arthritis of her spine (R. 304). 
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The medical panel, consisting of Boyd G. Holbrook, 
M.D., and Allen McFarlane, M.D., was appointed by the Inrlustr;d 1 
commission to evaluate the medical aspects of the case (R. 279J 
The medical panel reviewed the file and submitted their 
conclusion which stated, in part: 
COMBINED DUE TO ALL CAUSES 
(5) Previously existing and concurrent physical 
impairment is 47%. 
(6) The industrial accident did not result in 
permanent incapacity substantially greater 
than the applicant would have incurred had she 
not had the pre-existing incapacity. It is 
possible that had she not had degenerative--
cervical arthritis of her spine, the symptoms 
in her neck at the time of her accident would 
have been considerably less, would not have 
been so prolonged and would not have rendered 
any permanent physical impairment. This 
would be anticipated but is speculative. 
Almost all of this woman's impairment is a 
result of non-industrial factors. Except for the 
cervical area there is no relationship between 
the industrial accident and the other medical 
problems and physical impairment that she has. 
The accident did not "break the camel's back" 
as her extensive present disability is almost 
entirely the result of non-industrial impairments. 
Except for the cervical area, there is no 
relationship between the industrial accident 
and the other medical problems and physical 
impairment that she has. 
(7) No further medical treatment including 
medications will be reasonably required in 
treating the applicant as a result of the 
industrial injury in the foreseeable future. 
(R. 303-304) (Emphasis added). 
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The Administrative Law Judge, in his Findings of Fact, 
~nclusions of Law and Order, adopted the findings of the 
n~dical panel as his own, stating: 
The crucial question is whether or not aside from 
the cervical area there is evidence to support the 
applicant's claim that the industrial injury 
resulted in permanent incapacity substantially 
greater than she would have incurred if she 
has not had the pre-existing incapacities. 
Certainly obesity in and of itself could properly 
be regarded as an impairment, but it is incon-
ceivable that obesity can be considered a oermanent 
impairment in the sense contemplated by the 
statute. 
The Administrative Law Judge is unaware of any 
Utah Supreme Court case that has required a permanent 
and total disability where obesity has been a 
dominant factor in the claim for disability. 
Furthermore, the Administrative Law Judge is 
unaware of any Supreme Court case that has required 
the payment of Second Injury Fund benefits for 
pre-existing conditions where the pre-existing 
conditions have been unrelated to the industrial 
accident. 
rP. 116-17) (Emphasis added). 
These Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
were entered by the Administrative Law Judge on June 29, 1983. 
~ipellant, the State Insurance Fund, filed a Writ of Review 
with this Court on July 29, 1983. Applicant, Wilma Hall, 
f1led a Petition for Writ of Review, For Cross-~rit of Review 
and Joinder in 1:rit of Review on August 1, 1983. The State 
Insurance Fund based its Writ of Review on the following 
1~,r1t·~nt1ons: 
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1. The Industrial Conunission acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in holding that obesity did not interact with 
Ms. Hall's industrial injury to result in impairment substant1.,, 
greater than she would have incurred had she not had that 
preexisting condition. 
2. The Industrial Conunission acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in holding the degenerative arthritis did not 
interact with the industrial injury to result in a oermanent 
incapacity substantially greater than Ms. Hall would have 
incurred had she not had the preexisting incapacity. 
3. The Industrial Conunission acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in finding that Ms. Ball's cardiovascular 
disease, Class 1, did not interact with the industrial 
injury to result in a permanent incapacity substantially 
greater than Ms. Ball would have incurred without that pre-
existing incapacity. 
4. The Industrial Conunission acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in holding that all of Ms. Hall's combined nre-
existing incapacities, equalling 47% impairment to the whole 
body, did not interact with the industrial injury to result 
in an impairment substantially greater than 11s. Hall would 
have sustained without the preexisting conditions. 
5. The Industrial Commission acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in deciding that in Ms. Hall's case the "sllr•c;tor•' 
greater" test was not met because most of Ms. Hall's incapac1t1· 
were ''nonindustrial.'' 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY AND 
CAPRICIOUSLY IN FINDING THAT MS. HALL'S OBESITY 
COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED A PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT 
WHICH INTERACTED WITH THE INDUSTRIAL INJURIES TO 
RESULT IN A PERMANENT INCAPACITY SUBSTANTIALLY 
GREATER THAN MS. HALL WOULD HAVE SUFFERED HAD SHE 
NOT I!AD THE PREEXISTING INCAPACITY OF OBESITY. 
Utah Code Ann. , Section 3 ~-1-ti 9, which provides for 
retmbursement for preexisting incapacity, provides in part: 
If any employee who has previously incurred a 
permanent incapacit:; by accidental injury, 
disease, or congenital causes, sustains an indus-
trial injury for which compensation and medical 
care is Provided by this title that results in 
permanent incapacity which is substantially 
greater than he would have incurred if he had not 
had the pre-existing incapacity, compensation 
and medical care, which medical care and other 
related items are outlined in Section 35-1-81, 
shall be awarded on the basis of the combined 
inJuries, but the liability of the employer 
for such compensation and medical care shall be 
for the industrial injury only and the remainder 
shall be paid out of the Special Fund provided 
for in Section 35-1-68(1) hereinafter referred 
to as the "special fund" (Emphasis added). 
This statute requires that the pre-existing incapacity be 
• µermanent incapacity. Apparently, the Administrative Law 
Judqe did not feel that obesity could be classified as 
11 ::,~ rmanen t 11 • In his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
ri11,j llrder ,- he states: 
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certainly obesity in and of itself could properly 
be regarded as an impairment, but it is inconce 1 vab le~ 
that obesity can be considered as a permanent 
impairment in the sense contemplated by the 
statute . 
The Administrative Law Judge is unaware of any 
Utah Supreme Court case that has required a f indinq 
of permanent and total disability where obesity 
has been a dominant factor in the claimed disabil1ty 
period. 
(R. 352-53). 
This is an illogical conclusion. The applicant has 
suffered from obesity and hypothyroidisM for Most of her life 
and has been under a doctor's care for this condition for some 
18 years, according to the medical panel report. \"lebster' s ::c,; 
Collegiate Dictionary defines permanent as "continuing or 
enduring without fundamental change." Certainly Ms. Hall's 
obesity and hypothyroidism have been "continuing and enduring 
without fundamental change" for most of her life. It seems 
clear that this pre-existing incapacity is indeed a permanent 
condition and that the Administrative Law Judge erred in findinq 
that it was not a permanent incapacity "in the sense contemplate,; 
by the statute." Furthermore, the fact that there are no cases 
to date in which obesity was a permanent pre-existing 
incapacity is hardly dispositive of the issue in this case. 
The Administrative Law Judge also determined that the 
pre-existing condition of obesity did not result in an in1ury 
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_,,i,strintially greater than Ms. Hall would have sustained 
,, 11 _,,,",t this pre-existing condition. The mere numbers which 
1,c medical panel included in their medical report indicate 
1,0 1 ns. Ila 11' s obesity resulted in a permanent incapacity 
,ubs~ant1ally greater than she would have incurred from her 
'"rlustnal accident had she not had the pre-existing 
lOl d~idCl ty 0 The medical panel stated that Ms. Hall suffered 
3 47* pre-existing permanent partial impairment, 30% of which 
was from mild hypothyroidism and obesity, and a 10% 
~ermanent partial impairment from the accident. When these 
1mpa1rments are totally co!O\bined, she has a 52% permanent 
partial impairment. Certainly, the existence of the 30% 
impairment from the obesity resulted in an impairment 
substantially greater than Ms. Hall would have suffered without 
tr1at pre-existing condition- Without the pre-existing 
incapacity of hypothyroid obesity, Ms. Hall's impairment would 
be 22% instead of 52%. Without all of the pre-existing incapacities, 
'·ls. Hall's permanent partial impairment would be 10% instead 
c•f 52%. Certainly 52% permanent partial inpairment is "substantially 
·:ireater" than 10% permanent partial impairment. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN FINDING THAT MS. HALL'S DEGEtlERATIVE ARTHRITIS 
DID NOT INTERACT WITH HER INDUSTRIAL INJURY SO 
AS TO RESULT IN A PERMANENT INCAPACITY SUBSTANTIALLY 
GREATER THAN SHE \'/OULD HAVE INCURRED fl_AD SHE '<OT 
HAD THE PRE-EXISTING ARTHRITIS. 
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Both the medical panel and the Administrative Law Jud~n 
referred to Ms. Hall's degenerative arthritis and, indeed, 
both suggested that the arthritis may have increased the 
injury sustained in the accident. However, neither the 
Administrative Law Judge nor the medical panel completed 
its discussion of the problem. The medical panel, in thPir 
conclusion adopted by the Administrative Law Judge, states: 
It is possible that had she not had the 
degenerative cervical arthritis of her spine, 
the symptoms in her neck at the time of her 
accident would have been considerably less, would 
not have been so prolonged and would not have 
rendered any permanent physical impairment. 
This would be anticipated but is speculative. 
Almost all of this woman's impairment is a result 
of non-industrial factors. Except for the 
cervical spine area there is no relationship 
between the industrial accident and the other 
medical problems and physical impairment she 
has. 
Except for the cervical area there is no relation-
ship between the industrial accident and the othe 
medical and physical impairment that she has. 
On three separate occasions, the medical panel refers to 
the cervical area and pre-existing problems and furthermore 
indicates that the existence of the arthritis in the cervical 
area probably increased the symptoms from the accident. 
However, in contradicto~y fashion, the medical panel then 
concludes that none of the pre-existing conditions interacteu 
with the injuries sustained in the industrial accident. -~0,r 
are illogical and are internally contradictory conclusion~-
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The Administrative Law Judge acted arbitrarily and capriciously 
,n adopting these illogical and contradictory conclusions as 
Furthermore, the Administrative Law Judge himself 
,,akes the same confusing, contradictory, and illogical 
conc:lusions when he states in his Conclusions of Law: 
IP. 316 l . 
It is abundantly clear from the medical panel 
report that the percentages assigned to the 
applicant's non-industrial impairment have no 
relationship to industrial accident except 
as to the impairment assigned to the residual 
of her cervical spine inJury. Had the applicant 
not had her pre-existing problems, the medical 
panel speculated that she may not have sustained 
any permanent physical impairment as a result 
of her industrial accident. Because of the 
pre-existing problems, at least to a substantial 
extent, the applicant does now have a 10% 
residual impairment in her cervical area . 
Again, the Judge continually refers to the fact that had 
'he applicant not had the pre-existing cervical problems 
cer impairment from the accident would have been less. 
i'et, in complete contradiction, the Administrative Law Judge 
concludes and the Industrial Commission accepts that the pre-
ex1st1ng conditions did not result in an impairment substantially 
~reciter than she would have incurred had she not had the pre-
existing conditions. Clearly, the acceptance of such 
illogical and contradictory conclusions was arbitrary and 
·cdpri<e1ous on the part of the Industrial Commission. 
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POINT III 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ACTED l\RBITRARILY 
AND CAPRICIOUSLY IN FINDING THAT MS. HALL'S 
CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE, CLASS I, DID NOT 
INTERACT WITH THE INDUSTRIAL I~1JURY TO 
RESULT IN A PERMANENT INCAPACITY 
SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER THAN MS. HALL WOULD 
HAVE INCURRED WITHOUT THAT PRE-EXISTING 
INCAPACITY. 
The hypertensive cardiovascular disease, Class 1, suffererl 
by Ms; Hall was a permanent pre-existing disease that created 
a resulting industrial injury substantially greater than what 
would have occurred had the disease not been present. The 
very numbers expressed by the medical panel show that without 
this heart disease Ms. Ball's incapacity would have been less, 
her recovery capacity greater, and she would not have suffered t>.c 
amount of disability she now suffers as a result of the industru: 
injury. The medical panel states that Ms. Hall's hypertensive 
cardiovascular disease has resulted in a 5% permanent impajrment. 
Certainly this 5% permanent impairment has interacted with the 
industrial accident and the other pre-existing conditions to resu: 
in a 52% permanent partial impairment. 
POINT IV 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY 
AND CAPRICIOUSLY IN HOLDING THAT ALL OF THE 
COMBINED PRE-EXISTING INCAPACITIES, EQUALLING 
47% IMPAIRMENT TO THE WHOLE BODY, DID NOT 
INTERACT WITH THE INDUSTRIAL INJURY TO RESULT 
IN AN IMPAIRMENT SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER THAN 
THAT MS. HALL WOULD HAVE SUSTAINED \VITHOUT 
THE PRE-EXISTING INCAPACITY. 
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All of Ms. Hall's pre-existing incapacities worked together 
t,, rc>sult in an industrial injury substantially greater than 
""Id have existed had the pre-existing incapacities not been 
~r~sent and working in tandem. Without all the pre-existing 
1ncapacities, Ms. Hall's permanent incapacity would be 10% 
instead of 52%. Ms. Hall could have recovered more quickly 
and easily from her injuries and would have been able to return 
t,J work. The very numbers presented by the medical panel 
demonstrate that the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial 
commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in finding that 
Ms. Hall's pre-existing injuries did not interact with her 
industrial injury to result in an incapacity substantially 
greater than she would have incurred without the pre-existing 
incapacities. 
POI!lT V 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY 
AND CAPRICIOUSLY IN DECIDING THAT IN MS. 
IIALL'S CASE THE "SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER" TEST 
WAS NOT MET BECAUSE MOST OF MS. HALL'S 
INCAPACITIES WERE NON-INDUSTRIAL. 
The Administrative Law Judge in this case merely adopted 
the medical panel conclusion that the "industrial accident did 
not result in permanent incapacity greater than the applicant 
~ould have incurred had she not had the pre-existing incapacity." 
1elther the Administrative Law Judge nor the medical panel 
-~ula1ned which pre-existing incapacity they were talking about 
1 n reaching this conclusion. The medical panel and the Judge 
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seemed to say that the single pre-existing condition from 
which Ms. Hall suffered fell into one major category of 
obesity. This is not the case. Aggregation of all pre-
existing conditions to determine whether the substantially 
greater requirement is met is improper because each may 
react with the industrial accident differently and cause 
a different result. Each separate incapacity must be 
examined individually to determine if the industrial injury 
was substantially greater because that incapacity was present. 
In making this examination of separate pre-existing incapacities, 
it is clear that even if Ms. Hall had had only one of these 
pre-existing incapacities, she still would meet the substantial!; 
greater requirement. 
In assessing whether the substantially greater test is 
met, it must first be determined exactly what that test ~eans. 
Neither the Administrative Law Judge nor the medical panel 
adequately explained what they thought "substantially greater" 
meant, despite the fact that such a request was made to the 
panel. The panel's reasoning, adopted by the Judge, seems 
to be that because Ms. Hall's present disability is a result 
of non-industrial factors, the substantially greater test was 
not met. This, however, is not the test for substantially 
greater. 
As explained in Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, 
610 P.2d 334 (Utah 1980), and Kincheloe v. Coca Cola Bottlino 
656 P.2d 440 (Utah 1982), the fact that the recent industrial 
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1 niucy is not related to the pre-existing incapacity is not 
115 positive of the question of whether the industrial injury 
, 5 substantially greater than it would have been without the 
cr~-existing incapacities. The test requires only that the 
1udge determine whether the incapacity resulting from the 
industrial accident is substantially greater because the 
pre-existing conditions are present, so long as the pre-
existing conditions are a result of disease, injury, or 
congenital cause. The test does not require the judge to examine 
whether the pre-existing condition is mostly a result of 
industrial factors. The Utah Supreme Court, in Intermountain 
Health Care, Inc. v. Ortega, 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977), explained 
what is meant by "permanent incapacity . substantially greater 
than if the pre-existing incapacity is nonexistent." In that 
c~se the applicant suffered from a pre-existing psychological 
condition relating to pain in his back. A back strain resulted 
in a medical panel determination that he had a 30% permanent 
partial disability with 10% of that pre-existing and 20% due 
to an industrial incident. The Court explained: 
The requirement that the pre-existing condition 
combines with a later injury as a "substantially 
greater" incapacity does not mean that the former 
must be greater than the latter. It simply means 
that it be some definite and measurable portion 
of the causation of the disability. 
It surely cannot be doubted that 30% is 
substantially greater than 20%, that the 10% 
disability is itself substantial but that it 
is definite and measurable. Consequently, 
inasmuch as it appears that the pre-existing 
condition increased the resulting disability 
by one-third, it follows that under the 
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requirements of the statute, the medical expenses 
as well as the compensation awards should have 
been apportioned two-thirds from the employPr 
and one-third from the special fund. 
Id., at 619. 
In applying the substantially greater test, it is obvious 
that the disability suffered by Ms. Hall due to the industrial 
injury is greater because of her pre-existing conditions. 
Certainly 52% is substantially greater than 10%. These pre-
existing conditions prevented her from recovering normally 
from the industrial injury, and due to this failure to recover, 
she has been unable to, and probably never will, return to 
work. Ms. Hall's permanent incapacity was substantially greater 
than it would have been had she not had the pre-existing 
conditions. This conclusion is borne out by the numbers. 
The Administrative Law Judge acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in adopting the medical panel finding that Ms. 
Hall's pre-existing conditions did not result in a substantially 
greater incapacity than she would have incurred without those 
pre-existing conditions. 
POINT VI 
THE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT RESULTED IN A PERMANENT 
PARTIAL INCAPACITY SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER THAN 
WHAT WOULD HAVE EXISTED WITHOUT THE PRE-
EXISTING INCAPACITIES; THEREFORE THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY 
IN NOT ORDERING REIMBURSEMENT TO THE STATE 
INSURANCE FUND FROM THE SECOND INJURY FUND Ill 
AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO THE PERCENTAGE OF THE 
PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY ATTRIBUTABLE TO 
THE PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS. 
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This Court's interpretation of Section 35-1-69 has consistently 
allnwed contribution from the Second Injury Fund for all types of 
"orKcr compensation payments in an amount equal to the 
""rcentage of permanent partial disability attributable 
to any pre-existing condition. McPhie v. United States 
Steel Corp., 551 P. 2d 504 (Utah 1976); Intermountain 
Hedlth, Inc,, v. Ortega, 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977); White 
Industrial Commission, 604 P.2d 478 (Utah 1979); 
Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, 610 P.2d 334 (Utah 
19801; Paoli v. Cottonwood Hospital, 656 P.2d 410 (Utah 1982); 
cnited States Fidelity & Guarantee Company v. Industrial Commission, 
r;47 P.2d 754 (Utah 1983). Although Section 35-1-69 was amended 
in 1981, the Legislature did not state that the amendment was 
retroactive. Therefore, the insurance carrier should be reimbursed 
for all benefits paid. The pre-1981 statute is applicable 
r,cre since the injury involved occurred on !larch 9, 1981, 
and those amendments did not go into effect until March 12, 1981. 
In Intermountain Health Care, this Court held that 
Section 35-1-69 required proportionate contributions from the 
special fund (the Second Injury Fund) for compensation 
and medical benefits in cases involving pre-existing injuries. 
Th"' Commission found that the claimant had a partial disability 
of 30%; 10% attributable to pre-existing psychological conditions 
1nd 2oi attributable to an accident which occurred on the job. 
fhp Commission failed, however, to require the Second Injury 
Fur1d lo pay its proportionate share of medical expenses. This 
1',,urt found that Section 35-1-69 required the Second Injury Fund 
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to reimburse the insurance carrier for one-third of the medical 
expenses and compensation because one-third of the employee' 
permanent partial disability was attributable to the rre-en ~t_ 1, 
condition. In the instant case, the numbers presented by t lw 
medical panel indicate that 47% of the applicant's disabilit~ 
is attributable to pre-existing conditions. Therefore, the 
Second Injury Fund is obligated to reimburse the State InsurancE 
Fund for a percentage of benefits and medical expenses, which 
the State Insurance Fund has paid to the applicant equal to 
that percentage of permanent partial disability attributable 
to the applicant's many pre-existing conditions. 
This Court extended the holding of Intermountain Health 
Care to cover temporary total disability compensation in the 
case of White v. Industrial Commission, 604 P.2n 478 (Utah 
1979). The Court consolidated several cases, each of which 
depended upon judicial construction of Section 35-1-69. In 
each case the Court held the Second Injury Fund must reimburse 
the insurance carrier for a proportion of medical expenses and 
temporary total disability compensation equal to the oercenta0e 
of permanent partial disability applicable to the pre-existing 
injury. In the instant case, the State Insurance Fund has paiJ 
a substantial amount in medical expenses and temporary total 
disability and permanent partial disability, and the Fund shoulJ 
be reimbursed for that portion of these payments equal to the 
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rercentage of the impairment due to the applicant's pre-existing 
inrapac1 ties. 
In Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, 610 P.2d 334 
1
uuh 1980), this Court again held that the Commission erred in 
'rcler ing the employer to pay all medical compensation and temporary 
total disability benefits when a portion of the disability 
was attributable to a pre-existing injury. In that case, the 
Court stated: 
We think that the reasonable conclusion to be 
drawn therefrom is that the employer is respon-
sible for only the percentage of compensation 
and medical care which the injury occurring in 
the employment bears to the applicant's total 
disability. This conclusion is also borne out 
by the final provision that any amount which 
has been paid by the employer in excess of the 
portion attributable to the industrial injury 
should be reimbursed to him out of the special 
fund. 
Id. at 337. 
Section 35-1-69 was amended in 1981. Though the 1981 
anendments do not apply here, this Court's interpretation 
of the statute even after those amendments indicates the 
~eneral purpose and structure of the Second Injury Fund 
requires that it reimburse the insurance carrier for all 
expenses and disability paid out. In United States Fidelity 
& Guarantee Co. v. Industrial Commission, 657 P.2d 754 (Utah 
1983), this Court interpreted 35-1-69, as amended. Thougn 
lhdt case involved several statutes and a fairly complicated 
tact situation, the Court discussed the implication and purpose 
·' Section 35-1-69: 
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Explicit statutory authority exists to 
apportion compensation awards and medical 
costs between the employers and the Second 
Injury Fund, provided certain conditions 
are met. Basically those conditions are 
three in number: ( 1) Permanent incapacity 
of the employer is assessed on "the basis of 
the percentage of permanent physical impair-
ment attributable to the industrial injury 
only and the remainder shall be paid out of 
a said special (Second Injury) fund. 
Id., at 767. 
In the instant case, the State Insurance Fund has paid 
temporary total disability, medical expenses and permanent 
partial disability due to the industrial accident of approximate' 
$12,000.00. Since the medical panel itself found that 47' nf 
Ms. Hall's impairment was due to pre-existing incapacities, the 
State Insurance Fund should be reimbursed from the Second In i un· 
Fund for 47/52nds or 90%, as is described in the statute and 
relative case law. 
CONCLUSION 
The Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in adopting the medical panel'' 
conclusion that the industrial accident did not result in 
permanent incapacities substantially greater than Ms. Hall 
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wnuld have incurred had she not had the pre-existing 
The findings were internally contradictory. 
,P clcn1al of the State Insurance Fund's Motion for Review 
111 be reversed. The State Insurance Fund respectfully 
c"guests this Court remand this case to the Industrial 
':o~cmiss1on so that they may make an appropriate determination 
cE the amount of reimbursement the State Insurance Fund should 
r•ce1~e from the Second Injury Fund. 
1·{espectfully submitted this ____ day of December, 1983. 
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